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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant Maria Duran is from a final order of the 
Labor Commission of Utah dated November 30, 2006. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-
3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the Labor Commission properly deny Ms. Duran's motion to set-aside 
default and proceed to hear the merits of the case when Petitioner filed a Withdrawal of 
her Application for Hearing only hours prior to the evidentiary hearing without giving 
notice to opposing counsel? This issue was preserved at Rule 213 et al. 
Standard of Review: A court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion 
in granting or denying a motion to set a default judgment aside. See Board of Educ. v. 
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963). A trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default 
involves the trial court's discretionary power, and the Court of Appeals will not disturb 
the trial court's decision in such matters absent a clear abuse of such discretion. See 
Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Issue: Did the Commission properly dismiss this case "with prejudice" when 
Petitioner failed to attend the long-scheduled evidentiary hearing and present evidence to 
support her claim and, when, based upon the resulting hearing record, Administrative 
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Law Judge Marlowe found that Petitioner was not entitled to further benefits? This issue 
was preserved at Rule 213 et al. 
Standard of Review: The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows this court 
to grant relief where the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law," 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), or where "the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(a). "When reviewing an application or interpretation of law we use a correction of 
error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's interpretation of the law." 
Discretion is granted to the Commission's "application of the law to particular facts only 
when 'there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, 
either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language.'" In this case, 
whether the Commission properly dismissed a case "with prejudice" involves a correction 
of error standard of review as no discretion has been granted under the applicable Utah 
statute. See Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There is no determinative appellate law. However, several statutes and rules are 
applicable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll provides: 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the 
adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate 
in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; oRule.. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default and 
shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default 
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the 
default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative 
proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, 
conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative 
proceeding without the participation of the party in default and shall 
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the agency 
and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, dismiss the proceeding. 
Id. 
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Utah Rule Civ. Proc. 41 provides: 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof 
(1) By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(1), and of any 
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of 
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party 
of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless 
otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, 
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when 
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of 
any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be 
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; oRule 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him 
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against 
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the 
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may 
then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to 
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for 
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lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2)(a)(vii) provides: 
if the administrative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required 
by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled 
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and 
a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may 
be held in default. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4) provides: 
(4)(a)(i). Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an 
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, the Division 
of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the employee's claim 
should not be dismissed because the employee has failed to meet the employee's 
burden of proof to establish an entitlement to compensation claimed in the 
application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(I) may be entered on the motion of 
the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrieRule 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a claim: 
(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates themerits of the 
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application for 
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hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii). 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question of whether the Utah Labor Commission properly 
determined that an employee who files for worker's compensation benefits cannot 
withdraw her Application for Hearing only hours before trial without leave of the court. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals must consider whether the Commission, upon 
reviewing the merits of this case, properly dismissed this case "with prejudice". 
Course of the Proceedings / Statement of Facts 
1. On January 23, 2004, Ms. Duran ("Petitioner"), through legal counsel Virginius 
Dabney, filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission seeking 
entitlement to workers' compensation benefits arising from an alleged accident on 
January 1, 2003 while working for Shoney's Restaurant. She alleged that she 
slipped on juice, but did not fall, while carrying plates, with injuries to her spine 
and lower extremities. (Rule, 1.) 
2. On March 3, 2004, respondents filed an Answer to the Application for Hearing. 
Respondents denied the injuries alleged by Petitioner. (Rule, 26). 
3. On January 6, 2005, the Labor Commission set this matter for hearing in St. 
George on April 26, 2005 at 1:00 p.m. (Rule, 30). That notice stated: 
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"YOU MUST NOTIFY US WITHIN 10 DAYS IF YOU WANT TO 
CHANGE THE TIME OR DATE, OTHERWISE YOU WILL BE 
REQUIRED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE. If you fail to appear at the time 
your case is to be heard, your case may be dismissed or you may be 
defaulted." 
Id- (Emphasis in original.) 
4. On January 26, 2005, petitioner's counsel, Virginius Dabney, wrote to Judge 
Marlowe indicating that a ". . . . half day may not be long enough so I would 
appreciate a setting for a full day. However, we do not want to give up the half-
day setting if there is no full day available. We want to have the hearing because 
the case has been pending for so long." (Rule, 31) 
5. On February 7, 2005, the Court informed the parties that the hearing would 
proceed on April 26, 2005, with an additional date given later if necessary. (Rule, 
32) 
6. On March 11, 2005, Mr. Dabney again requested a full day for the hearing. (Rule, 
37). In a hand-written response dated March 16, 2005, Judge Marlowe again 
indicated that she would go forward on the scheduled half day, with any remaining 
evidence to be presented in Salt Lake City or on the next St. George calendar, if 
necessary. (Rule, 37) 
7. On March 16, 2005, Mr. Dabney again wrote to Judge Marlowe requesting a full 
day for a hearing. (Rule, 38). 
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On March 18, 2005, counsel for respondents objected to a continuance, noting that 
only three witnesses had been identified for the hearing: Ms. Duran, Ken Lister, 
and Louise Randall (a manager from Shoney's). With only three nominated 
witnesses, respondents' counsel argued that the case should not last longer than 
three hours, let alone the four hours as scheduled. (Rule, 40). 
On April 8, 2005, Respondents filed a Motion to preclude Petitioner's expert 
witness from testifying on the basis that Petitioner had refused to provide an 
outline of testimony of that witness or otherwise make the witness available to be 
deposed. (Rule, 62). 
On April 22, 2005, petitioner's counsel again requested that the case be 
rescheduled for a full day of hearing. (Rule, 75). 
On April 22, 2005 the ALJ granted Respondents' motion to exclude Petitioner's 
expert witness. (Rule, 77). 
Late in the afternoon of April 25, 2005, on or about 2:30 pm (the day prior to the 
scheduled hearing), Mr. Dabney faxed a letter to the Labor Commission indicating 
that petitioner was withdrawing her Application for Hearing. Petitioner did not 
request permission to withdraw; rather the letter simply notified the ALJ of this 
intent. Petitioner indicated that she would file an Amended Application for 
Hearing in order to allow Mr. Lister, a vocational expert, to testify on behalf of 
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petitioner.1 (Rule, 81.) Judge Marlowe had already left Salt Lake City for the 
hearing and did not receive the letter. 
13. Mr. Dabney did not provide notice to Respondents' counsel relative to the 
withdrawal of the claim. To the contrary, even petitioner's fax shows that it did 
not successfully transmit to respondents' counsel. (Rule, 82) 
14. On April 26, 2005, Respondents' counsel traveled from Salt Lake City to St. 
George for the scheduled hearing. At the time of the scheduled hearing, Judge 
Marlowe informed respondents' counsel of the withdrawal of the Application for 
Hearing. The issues outlined in Willard v. Thurston Cable. Labor Commission 98-
0569 (7/29/02) were addressed and, since neither petitioner nor her counsel were 
present, petitioner's default was entered. In addition, Judge Marlowe conducted 
an evidentiary hearing whereby the court took sworn testimony from Louise 
Randall, Shoney's manager. Ms. Randall testified that Shoney's will close in May 
2005, having sold out to Ruby River. Ms. Randall also brought evidence with her 
to court which included forty-five plates from Shoney's- the number of plates 
allegedly being carried by Petitioner at the time of her accident. A transcript of 
that hearing is provided at Rule, 213. 
!The court had previously excluded Mr. Lister as a witness since petitioner's counsel 
had not provided to respondents a summary of Mr. Lister's proposed testimony, had not made 
Mr. Lister available to be deposed on a timely basis, and had not objected to respondents' 
Motion to Exclude Mr. Lister as a witness. 
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15. At the hearing, Respondents counsel noted that there was no reason why Petitioner 
nor her attorney, both St. George residents, could not attend the hearing. 
Respondents stressed that both Respondents' legal counsel and the ALJ had 
traveled from Salt Lake City to St. George for this hearing. Respondents also noted 
that they had brought evidence and a witness that may be otherwise unavailable if 
the hearing was continued. (Rule, 213). 
16. On May 3, 2005, Judge Marlowe entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order detailing nearly 10 pages. Based upon her review of the medical 
records and the testimony of Ms. Randall, Judge Marlowe denied any further 
benefits to petitioner. (Rule, 83-91).2 The ALJ stated in her Order that a default 
order was appropriate under section 63-46b-11 of the Utah Code since Petitioner 
failed to appear at the hearing. The ALJ also agreed that, under Rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Labor Commission precedent, Petitioner was 
2
 In fact, the medical records show very little support, if any for Petitioner's claim. 
An MRI taken of her lumber spine on May 5, 2003 returned normal. See Rule, 212, at 52. 
Additionally, an MRI taken of her cervical spine show only minor degenerative changes. See 
Rule, 212, at 51. In addition, Petitioner did not begin to complain of neck pain for four 
months after the claimed industrial accident. See Rule, 212, at 49, 51. Even Petitioner's 
treating doctor opined that her neck condition "could" be related to work, an opinion which 
does not satisfy the medical probability standard and is, at best, speculative. See Rule, 212, 
at 49. Even a chiropractor, Dr. Labrum, found that Petitioner was able to return to work in 
January 2003. See Rule, 212, 23. Nonetheless, temporary total disability benefits were paid 
to Petitioner well after this stability date until Dr. Richard Knoebel saw Petitioner on August 
26, 2003. See Rule, 212 at 34-46. Hence, there is arguably a large overpayment of 
temporary total disability in this case. 
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required to receive permission from the court to withdraw her Application for 
Hearing and could not unilaterally do so by her letter of April 25, 2005. The ALJ 
ruled that she would treat Petitioner's letter as a motion to withdraw the 
Application for Hearing. Finding no good reason for Petitioner to withdraw her 
Application for Hearing, the ALJ denied the motion and proceeded with the 
hearing. Upon considering the merits, the ALJ ultimately denied further benefits. 
(Rule, 83-91). 
17. On June 3, 2005, petitioner filed her Motion for Review. (Rule, 92). 
18. On June 22, 2005, respondents filed a memorandum in opposition to petitioner's 
Motion for Review. (Rule, 102). 
19. On July 7, 2005, Judge Marlowe, treating petitioner's Motion for Review as a 
Motion to Set Aside Default, entered an Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Set 
Aside Default. (Rule, 136). 
20. On July 29, 2005, petitioner filed a reply memorandum in response to the 
memorandum filed by respondents. (Rule, 141). 
21. On July 29, 2005, petitioner also filed a second Motion for Review of Judge 
Marlowe's Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default. (Rule, 139). 
22. On November 30, 2006, the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. (Rule, 207). 
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23. On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Review and Docketing 
Statement. Following unsuccessful mediation, petitioner's brief was set for May 
4, 2007. 
24. On April 30, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and 
supporting memorandum. 
25. On May 16, 2007 the Court denied Petitioner's Motion. 
26. On July 30, 2007 Petitioner filed her Appellate Brief with the Court of Appeals. 
13 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was no error by the Commission in dismissing Petitioner's case with 
prejudice. Under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner was required to 
have permission of the court to withdraw her Application for Hearing and could not 
unilaterally do so by her letter of April 25, 2005. Even assuming that Petitioner's letter 
of April 25, 2005 was properly treated as a motion to withdraw the Application for 
Hearing (although not phrased as a motion), the ALJ appropriately determined that 
Petitioner's purported reason to withdraw her Application for Hearing -based upon the 
fact that she wanted a full day hearing — was inadequate, and she properly denied the 
motion to withdraw and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing. Since Petitioner failed to 
attend the hearing, despite having proper notice, an Order of Default was fittingly entered 
under section 63-46b-11 of the Utah Code. Additionally, the Court appropriately 
proceeded to conduct further proceedings by hearing the merits of this case as allowed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 1(4). Having heard the case on the merits, and finding no 
further benefits appropriate in this case, the ALJ properly denied benefits to Petitioner 
and entered a dismissal with prejudice as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
417(4)(b)(ii)(A). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE COMMISSION PROPERLY RULED THAT MS. DURAN DOES 
NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW HER 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE 
WITHDRAWAL OCCURS LESS THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE 
SCHEDULED HEARING WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE TO 
OPPOSING COUNSEL. 
Ms. Duran submits that the Utah Labor Commission erred in upholding the ALJ's 
entry of default and proceeding to hear the case on the merits since "long standing 
commission custom and practice" allows an applicant, at any time, to withdraw an 
Application for Hearing prior to hearing. Indeed, Petitioner argues that the Labor 
Commission committed error in dismissing her case with prejudice since she filed a 
Withdrawal of the Application for Hearing, albeit only hours prior to the scheduled 
hearing. In other words, Petitioner essentially argues that it is somehow appropriate for 
the Labor Commission to allow the ALJ, opposing counsel, the parties, and the witnesses 
in a case to prepare for and to travel to a hearing and, only hours before the hearing, to 
permit the petitioner, without notice to opposing counsel, to withdraw the claim, without 
prejudice, with the expressly stated intent to re-file immediately with the Commission the 
exact same claim. 
Petitioner cites two Labor Commission decisions, Willard v. Thurston Cable, Case 
No. 98-0568 (7/29/02), and Barton v. St. George Steel 97-0887 (11/29/00) to support her 
position that "long standing custom and practice" allows voluntary withdrawal of the 
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Application for Hearing on the day before trial. This allegation, of course, is not correct. 
In fact, the Commission in Willard squarely addresses this issue and supports 
Respondents' position lhat, once an answer or responsive pleading is filed, judicial 
approval is needed before an applicant may withdraw his or her Application for Hearing. 
In Willard, the claimant filed a "Withdrawal of Application for Hearing Without 
Prejudice" purporting to withdraw his Application for Hearing on the grounds that he was 
incarcerated and could not participate in the adjudicative process. The ALJ cancelled the 
hearing without giving the opposing party the opportunity to respond. The Commission 
held that the ALJ erred in allowing the unilateral withdrawal of the Application for 
Hearing. The court cited to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure noting that Rule 
41(a) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action unilaterally at any time prior to the 
opposing party's answer or other response. The Commission further cited to Rule 41(b) 
which indicates that where an Answer has already been filed, "an action may only be 
dismissed .... based either on: (i) stipulation of the parties who have appeared in the 
action; or (ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper..." 
In Willard, the Commission ultimately concluded: 
"In view of the foregoing provisions of Rule 41, and in the absence of any 
stipulation for dismissal between the parties, the Commission concludes that 
Commission permission is required before Mr. Willard may withdraw his 
Application for Hearing in this matter." 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
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In the present case, petitioner Duran blanketly argues that she has an unconditional 
right to withdraw her Application for Hearing at any time, prior to the actual hearing, with 
or without notice to opposing counsel and with or without permission from the Labor 
Commission. She argues that the Commission's decision in Willard, is not applicable to 
her case, arguing that long standing "Commission custom" allows the withdrawal of 
Applications for Hearing at any time. 
Petitioner's analysis is seriously flawed. The Labor Commission's ruling in 
Willard applies specifically to any case where a petitioner seeks to voluntarily withdraw 
an Application for Hearing prior to the scheduled hearing. The Labor Commission's 
analysis is clearly set forth in Willard. Moreover, respondents specifically deny the 
existence of a "Commission custom" of allowing a withdrawal of the claim at any time 
prior to a hearing. Willard, decided by the Labor Commission in 2002, itself stands to the 
contrary of that proposition. Petitioner has failed to cite to any Labor Commission ruling 
indicating that one may simply withdraw an Application for Hearing the day prior to a 
scheduled hearing. Even if there had been such a "custom" prior to 2002 (which 
Respondents deny), that "custom" was expressly revoked by the Labor Commission's 
decision in Willard. 
In this case, since an Answer was filed and, in fact, the hearing was only hours 
away, Petitioner was required to obtain permission of the ALJ to withdraw her 
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Application for Hearing. Since the court did not grant her leave to withdraw, she was 
under a clear obligation to appear at the hearing. 
POINT 2: THE COMMISSION WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN NOT 
ACCEPTING PETITIONER'S VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF HER 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING. 
The Commission did not commit error in holding that it would not accept 
Petitioner's voluntary dismissal of her Application for Hearing. As noted, under Rule 41 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of a stipulation by the parties, 
Commission permission is required before a petitioner may obtain dismissal of their legal 
action. Such action may only be dismissed "upon such terms and conditions as the court 
deems proper". See Utah Rule Civ. P. 41. Petitioner fails to show why the reasons given 
in the ALJ's Order of May 3, 2005 constitute error. Additionally, Petitioner failed to even 
attend the hearing to explain why leave would be appropriate. In fact, Judge Marlowe 
had sufficient grounds for denying petitioner's motion to withdraw which was affirmed 
by the Commission: 
First Judge Marlowe correctly noted that the motion to withdraw had only been 
faxed to the Labor Commission on the day prior to the scheduled hearing at 2:39 p.m. 
Obviously, Judge Marlowe was concerned with the late notice having been provided to 
the Commission regarding the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing. 
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Second, Judge Marlowe noted that the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing 
had never been sent to respondents' counsel. This finding is supported by the evidence 
attached to petitioner's own Motion for Review, indicating that petitioner's attempted fax 
to Blackburn & Stoll was not successful. 
Third, due to the lack of notice to respondents' counsel, a large expense was 
incurred on behalf of respondents. In this regard, counsel for respondents spent a great 
deal of time on April 25, 2005 preparing for the hearing. Counsel for respondents also 
incurred the cost of flying to St. George on April 26 and renting a car in order to appear at 
the scheduled hearing. Respondents also had to incur the legal fees of having Mr. Dyer 
spend a day in St. George for the hearing and meet with and prepare his witness for 
hearing. 
Fourth, Judge Marlowe noted that Louise Randall appeared as a witness to testify 
on behalf of respondents. However, in her testimony, Ms. Randall noted that Shoney's 
had already been sold to Ruby River and would be closing within a month's time. Thus, 
the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing could significantly jeopardize the 
availability of respondents' witness.3 
Fifth, it appears that Petitioner has already been compensated to the extent allowed 
by the Worker's Compensation Act for any injuries from this accident. The medical 
Respondents note that it has now been two years since Shoney's closed in St. George. 
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evidence presented at hearing revealed that following the January 1, 2003 accident 
Petitioner continued to work until January 6, 2003. Dr. Labrum found her unable to work 
from January 6, 2003 until January 155 2003 and he then released her to return to work. 
Despite this release, Respondents continued to pay temporary total disability to Petitioner 
until August 26, 2003 when she was evaluated by Dr. Knoebel. At that time, Dr. Knoebel 
found her to be medically stable with no permanent partial disability. He also noted that 
there were no significant objective findings by x-ray or MRI. Based upon these records, 
ALJ Marlowe would have been justified in terminating temporary total disability on 
January 15, 2003. However, she generously continued those benefits to Petitioner 
through August 26, 2003. See Rule, 88. 
Additionally, the MRI of Petitioner's back on May 3, 2005 returned normal. See 
Rule, 212 at 53. Based upon this MRI, Judge Marlowe was also justified in not awarding 
any permanent partial disability for Petitioner's lumbar spine. Likewise, Petitioner did 
not complain of cervical problems for nearly four months after the accident. Her treating 
doctor, Dr. Smith, opined that this condition "could be" related to the industrial event. 
See Rule, 212, at 49. Thus, based upon medical possibility, Judge Marlowe was again 
justified in not awarding permanent partial disability. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 96 Utah 510 (1939) (holding that while finding of the Commission may not rest 
on possibilities, it may properly rest on probabilities). 
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Sixth, Judge Marlowe noted that Louise Randall had brought with her forty-five 
plates from Shoney's Restaurant as evidence for the hearing. (In her deposition, 
petitioner claimed that she was carrying forty-five plates at the time of her slip.) 
However, due to the closure of Shoney's, respondents would be seriously disadvantaged 
at not having available the same evidence. 
Petitioner now argues that Judge Marlowe and the Commission did not adequately 
weigh the reasons for withdrawal. She argues that she was deprived of the ability to fully 
explain and substantiate the reasons for the withdrawal of the claim. 
In response to the arguments raised by petitioner, respondents note initially that 
petitioner did, in fact, have notice of the scheduled hearing. Had she wanted to appear to 
discuss the matter before Judge Marlowe, she certainly could have done so. Petitioner 
and her counsel both live in St. George and, should they have desired, could have 
appeared at the hearing by means of a five minute drive. Thus, if petitioner was deprived 
of the ability to explain the reason for the withdrawal of her claim, that deprivation was 
certainly self-inflicted. She chose not to appear at the scheduled hearing, and she did so 
at her own peril. Additionally, Petitioner's placement of blame on the ALJ is meritless. 
Petitioner places blame on the ALJ in failing to rule immediately on her notice of 
withdrawal, noting that had the judge promptly ruled, she would have been on notice to 
appear. Obviously, any intent to inform Petitioner of an immediately ruling would not 
have been possible since Petitioner did not attend the hearing. Nonetheless, Petitioner did 
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not frame her April 25, 2005 letter as a "motion". Rather, the April 22, 2005 letter filed 
by Petitioner is simply a notice to the court that she was withdrawing her claim. The 
judge kindly treated this letter as a motion, although she clearly was not required by law 
to do so. See Rule, 81. 
Moreover, even if Petitioner had appeared at the hearing, the purported basis for 
the withdrawal of the claim is insufficient from a legal standpoint. According to 
petitioner's letter of April 25, 2005, she was withdrawing her Application for Hearing in 
order to file an Amended Application for Hearing which could allow Mr. Lister to testify 
on behalf of petitioner In this regard, petitioner is clearly attempting to obtain a "second 
bite at the apple." Petitioner did not cooperate in discovery, nor did she respond to 
respondents' motion to exclude Mr. Lister from testifying.4 Thus, petitioner's true reason 
for withdrawing her Application for Hearing was that she was not prepared for the 
hearing, having disdained following appropriate legal rules for preparing for trial. This is 
not a situation when emergent circumstances prevented Petitioner and her attorney's 
attendance at hearing. Petitioner and her attorney, both residents of St. George, simply 
chose not to attend the scheduled hearing, knowing that both the ALJ and respondents' 
legal counsel had to travel from Salt Lake City to St. George to attend the hearing. 
4Judge Marlowe noted in her Order that, in a letter dated April 22,2005, Mr. Dabney 
explained that he had "neither the time nor the interest to respond" to the Motion. 
22 
Certainly, Petitioner and her attorney's legal delay tactics in this case should not be 
rewarded. 
Respondents respectfully submit that, on balance, Judge Marlowe and the 
Commission were justified in denying petitioner's motion to withdraw her Application for 
Hearing on the day prior to the scheduled hearing. The Commission's affirmance of 
Judge Marlowe's Order certainly does not constitute error. 
POINT 3: THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S CASE 
"WITH PREJUDICE" SINCE THE CASE WAS HEARD ON THE 
MERITS. 
Petitioner also argues that the Commission is not allowed to enter a dismissal 
"with prejudice" based upon a default. However, petitioner was not merely defaulted; 
rather, a hearing was held on the merits with medical records reviewed by the judge and 
hearing testimony taken. Because petitioner did not prove the prima facie elements 
necessary to support her claims, dismissal of her case "with prejudice" was allowed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(b)(ii)(A) since this claim was heard on the 
merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(b)(ii)(A) provides: 
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an 
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, the 
Division of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the 
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee has failed 
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to meet the employee's burden of proof to establish an entitlement to 
compensation claimed in the application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on the 
motion of the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrier. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a claim: 
(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the 
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application 
for hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417. (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-3 and -11 provide for the entry and 
penalty of a default when a party fails to properly attend or participate in a properly 
scheduled evidentiary hearing. Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(vii) of the Utah Code states: 
if the administrative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required 
by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled 
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and 
a statement thai a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may 
be held in default. 
24 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
The Notice from the Labor Commission in this case fully complied with the above 
strictures and was not deficient in any way, stating that a default may be entered if the 
parties fail to attend or participate in the hearing. Because this Labor Commission form 
fully complies with the Utah Code, petitioner's argument lacks merit. In any event, 
petitioner's attorney, a seasoned practitioner for over 20+ years, should be familiar with 
the Utah Code and other applicable Utah Worker's Compensation laws and should know 
that the failure to participate in a hearing could subject his client to default.5 
In this case, a hearing had been scheduled since January 6, 2005 and was known 
by the parties. The last hour withdrawal in this case constitutes dilatory action and/or 
intentional manipulation by Attorney Dabney and his client. To allow a default under the 
circumstances of this case to result merely in a dismissal "without prejudice" - as 
proposed by petitioner -- would be more than unjust: it should shock the conscience of the 
court. Petitioner's proposed "solution" will cause the potential for extreme delay and 
enormous expense to respondents in every single case since any counsel for a petitioner, 
if not feeling entirely prepared in any given case, could simply withdraw the claim only 
hours before the scheduled hearing. Respondents urge the Court to reject petitioner's 
5
 Petitioner's counsel has also been defaulted for this same practice by other ALJ's in 
other cases. See, e.g. Thiel v. Jack B. Parsons, case number 04-0058 (6-16-06) and Nelson 
v. Canyon. 05-0394 (10-3-05). 
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request for unfettered discretion relative to withdrawing an Application for Hearing at the 
Labor Commission. 
Utah's appellate courts have considered similar issues in Panos v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Ctrs.. 913 P.2d 363, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). There, the court cited Rule 41(b) and 
held: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of 
any claim against him. . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or 
for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
Utah Rule Civ. P. 41(b). 
Although the express language of Rule 41(b) states a defendant must bring 
a motion to dismiss to enforce a court order, we have ruled that a court may 
dismiss a claim sua sponte, without a motion by the defendant. "The 
language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not requires, a motion by defendant. 
. . . 'In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed 
under [Rule 41(b)], or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end."' . . 
.Therefore, under Rule 41(b), a trial court may dismiss claims with or 
without prejudice absent a motion by defendants. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, 63-46b-8 of the Utah Code "does not preclude the presiding officer 
from taking appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing." The Labor 
Commission's powers under the Utah Code (and UAPA) in conjunction with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure certainly give the AL J the discretion to impose the sanction of 
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dismissal with or without prejudice against a party who has failed to attend a properly 
scheduled hearing and who has engaged in dilatory and contumacious behavior. 
Respondents also note that the inherent powers of this tribunal permit the ALJ and 
Board to dismiss a case with prejudice and to award sanctions. In Barnard v. Wasserman, 
855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court stated: 
It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction 
possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these 
are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules 
for the regulation of the business before the court,.. . to recall and control 
its process, to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such, 
and to suspend, disbar, and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of 
courts are necessary to the proper discharge of their duties. . . . 
The summary jurisdiction which the court has over its attorneys as officers 
of the court. . . is inherent, continuing, and plenary . . . and ought to be 
assumed and exercised . . . not only to maintain and protect the integrity and 
dignity of the court, to secure obedience to its rules and process, and to 
rebuke interference with the conduct of its business, but also to control and 
protect its officers, including attorneys. . . . Courts of general jurisdiction . . 
.possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on 
attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and 
movement of cases through the court. 
14 (emphasis added); see Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255 (same). 
In Barnard, the Supreme Court held that because Mr. Barnard's actions as an 
attorney interfered with the administration of justice and wasted the court's time, the trial 
court had the authority to sanction him. The Supreme Court explained that "[although 
not explicitly provided for by rule, such awards are within the inherent powers of the 
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court and are in fact imposed regularly as a means of controlling the conduct of attorneys 
and litigants/' Barnard, supra. 
Similarly, in Griffith, the Supreme Court held that sanctions, while available under 
Rule 11 under limited circumstances, were properly awarded by the trial court under its 
"inherent powers to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney for wasting judicial 
resources" when a party made a meritless motion to disqualify. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at 
[^12. In Griffith, the court awarded sanctions to "'compensate for delay, inconvenience 
and the expenses resulting from [the attorney's] behavior.'" Id at ^14 (quoting Barnard, 
855P.2dat248). 
Like traditional courts of general and superior jurisdiction, the ALJ, acting on 
behalf of this administrative tribunal, had the inherent authority to impose sanctions 
which included dismissal of this case with prejudice, even if no statute or rule explicitly 
provided for such an award. Of course, in this case Utah statute allows for dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Adopting petitioner's reasoning would put respondents at a gross disadvantage. 
Dismissal "without prejudice" would allow petitioner the opportunity to re-file a new 
Application for Hearing under the Commission's continuing jurisdiction (section 34A-2-
420) and would allow her the opportunity for another hearing. See Doubletree v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting effect of dismissal 
without prejudice). Respondents had prepared for the hearing and had traveled to St. 
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George for the hearing on this matter. Similarly, the ALJ had traveled and had reviewed 
the hearing file which consisted of hundreds of medical records. To allow a claimant and 
her attorney simply to not attend the hearing on this matter and dismiss his or her case 
"without prejudice" is, in effect, a dilatory tactic that can only advance the interests of the 
petitioner. 
If an employer or its carrier fails to attend a hearing, and good cause is not found 
to excuse a default, the sanction is an adjudication of the case without participation of that 
party. The employer/carrier is not afforded the luxury of essentially "wiping the slate 
clean" and engaging in an entirely new hearing when and if they file a Request for 
Agency Action. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, respondents 
stress that the parties must be treated similarly and fairly. Since an employer/carrier 
would not be afforded the luxury of a new hearing if they had engaged in such tactics, 
petitioner, having failed to show good cause, should not either. Indeed, respondents 
would be prejudiced by dismissal without prejudice since they, the ALJ, and witnesses (if 
they are still available) would have to prepare for and travel, at their expense, to St. 
George for a new hearing. 
Petitioner further claims that the ALJ prejudiced her and committed a "sham" 
hearing since the hearing was conducted without her and resulted in dismissal "with 
prejudice". She argues that she was prejudiced because the ALJ did not notify her that 
the hearing would go forward without her. She also complains that the ALJ, having twice 
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denied petitioner's request for a full day hearing, did not respond immediately to 
petitioner's subsequent motions for reconsideration. 
As noted, the Commission set the matter for hearing in St. George, Utah for April 
26, 2005 at 1:00 pm. On January 26, 2005, petitioner's counsel wrote Judge Marlowe a 
letter asking for a full day hearing, but indicated that she would not want to give up a 
half-day slot if no full day slot was available. On February 7, 2005, the court informed 
the parties that the hearing would proceed on April 26, 2005 with an additional day given 
later, if needed. On March 11, 2005 petitioner again requested a full day for the hearing. 
In a handwritten response dated March 16, 2005 Judge Marlowe again indicated that she 
would go forward on the scheduled half-day hearing, with any remaining evidence to be 
presented in Salt Lake City, or on the next St. George calendar, if necessary. 
On March 16, 2005, Mr. Dabney again wrote Judge Marlowe requesting a full day 
hearing. On April 2, 2005, despite the prior rulings by the judge, Mr. Dabney again wrote 
to the judge asking for a full day hearing. The ALJ did not respond to these additional 
motions from Mr. Dabney since she had already rendered her rulings on two prior 
occasions. 
Late in the afternoon of April 25, 2005, Mr. Dabney faxed a letter to the Labor 
Commission (in Salt Lake City) indicating that his client was withdrawing her 
Application for Hearing. No notice was given to Shoney's (or to their legal counsel) 
relative to the withdrawal of the claim. On April 26, 2005 Shoney's counsel traveled 
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from Salt Lake City to St. George for the scheduled hearing. The judge in this case had 
previously traveled to St. George to conduct the hearing (there was no local judge on staff 
at the time to hold hearings in St. George), and, therefore, the ALJ was not in Salt Lake 
City to received petitioner's faxed notice. At the time of the hearing, the judge informed 
Shoney's legal counsel of petitioner's withdrawal of the Application for Hearing. 
Shoney's legal counsel asked the court to enter Ms. Duran's default based upon the Labor 
Commission's prior ruling in Willard v. Thurston Cable. He also asked to present 
witness testimony and to proceed on the merits. As a result of Ms. Duran and her 
counsel's failure to obtain leave of the court to withdraw the Application for Hearing, the 
court considered Petitioner's notice as a motion to withdraw and, finding no good reason 
to grant it, entered petitioner's default and allowed respondents to present testimony 
pursuant to section 63-46b-l 1(4) of the Utah Code. Based upon her review of all of the 
medical evidence and hearing testimony, the ALJ entered an Order addressing the merits 
of this case, ultimately finding in favor of Shoney's. This ruling was later affirmed by the 
Labor Commission. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Labor Commission's Order Affirming 
ALJ Decisions. Petitioner had the opportunity to participate in a scheduled hearing but 
failed to attend. Her attempt to withdraw her Application for Hearing on the eave of trial 
in the hopes of refiling at a later date is not allowed by Utah law and should not be 
rewarded by this court. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2007. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Michael E^Dyer 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellees Shoney's Restaurant 
and/or Wausau Insurance Company 
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